In recent years, Donald Davidson has developed a very original and interesting account ofthe social character oflanguage, or at least he has made his own position on this topic more explicit. I Davidson does not deny that language has a social dimension; rather, he rejects the widely shared thesis that successful communication requires that speaker and hearer share a language. This thesis is shared by philosophers like Wittgenstein, Dummett and Kripke. I will argue (Il) that Davidson' s arguments against this thesis are not convincing. Then (IIl) I will enter a more systematic discussion by trying to show that Davidson's account raises Wittgensteinian objections. 2 It cannot satisfactorily explain the very important contrast between correct and incorrect language-use. Davidson's theory cannot indicate convincing criteria for the correct use of a language that only one speaker speaks. All this does not imply that the thesis Davidson attacks is right but only that his attack on the thesis does not succeed. There are at least two reasons why Davidson's attack is worth discussing in some detail. On the one hand, it is very original and throws a particular light on Davidson's own theory ofmeaning. 
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